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BOOK REVIEWS
The Public Control of Business, by Dexter Merriam Keezer and Stacy
May. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930. Pp. xi, 267.
Because they believe the problem with which they deal "will present
a pivotal issue during the next decade," two economists have produced
this study of "government control of business activity." Taking the
view that such control is a means of securing the adequate functioning
of the business system, they seek to appraise and discover the future
possibilities of this means. Their concern is with three alternative regu-
latory devices: the antitrust laws, whose purpose is to preserve the
benefits of competition in business; direct regulation, which operates
by requiring a certain minimum performance on the part of the busi-
nesses to which it is applied; and public ownership, whereby the public
seeks to get what it wants for itself and at the same time to apply the
spur of an alien competition to private enterprise.
The possibilities and limitations which the authors seek to discover
in the foregoing devices are not those that have appeared in their oper-
ation. It is, rather, the power or lack of power of legislatures in the
United States to apply them and the consequent availability of each as
a means of control which the authors seek to ascertain. The book they
have written, consequently, is primarily a study of judicial decisions.
Therein lies both its strength and its weakness.
Such a book was called for. The field that it covers, logical though
its boundaries appear when they have been laid out, is one which a
lawyer, trained simply in the traditional legal categories, would not
have been likely to select. The authors' penetrating analysis of the
results of various series of decisions and the inevitable conclusion that
the effectiveness of at least the first two of the devices for government
control has been seriously impaired by the Supreme Court, must give
pause to anyone who is concerned about the operation of our system
of government. It will be especially wholesome for lawyers to read
the authors' castigations, express or implied, of the courts' treatment
of mergers under the Sherman Act (pp. 49-50), resale price fixing
(p. 58 et seq.), price fixing through legislation (p. 108 et seq.), and
valuation of public utilities (p. 157 et seq.). What has been done in
connection with these and other matters is sufficiently chargeable to
judges' and lawyers' methods of thought to call for a thorough over-
hauling by the bar of the legal machine which it operates. Attention
cannot be called too often or too forcibly to this situation, whether by
lawyers or by laymen.
In their conclusions regarding the future, however, the authors seem
to have surrendered too completely to a sense of futility of resorting in
this country to legislation, which must run the gauntlet of judicial
decision either in interpretation or in constitutional litigation. The
writers would be quite justified in arguing that the present system of
lawsuits to arrive at determinations of governmental power is cumber-
some, wasteful, unrealistic, and inconsistent in its operation. One could
sympathize, too, with a demand on their part that it be swept out and
replaced with another system. But they enter neither an express
indictment nor a prayer for relief. Instead they choose to be bound
by the present system. Since they anticipate no change in its operation
they come to the conclusion that the roads to effective public control of
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business are largely blocked unless public ownership can be made suc-
cessful. Not wishing to be revolutionary, they have become, rather,
fatalistic. It may be doubted whether they have chosen the only pos-
sible alternative, for change may be more likely than they think.
The authors' conclusion is a natural product of their search for a
general picture of the status of public control and of their belief that
such a picture is to be found, if anywhere, in recorded judicial decisions.
Their search and their belief are both natural, since lawyers themselves
have traditionally sought to form general pictures of fields of law and
have assumed that previous decisions, given effect by the doctrine of
stare decisis, furnish dependable data upon which to rely. But less
orthodox lawyers, with whom, presumably, the authors have much in
common, have ceased to believe that broad fields of law constitute useful
elassifications for many purposes. When it comes to estimating the
future, specific problems or situations are more useful centers of atten-
tion. The relevant data, too, include far more than mere past decisions,
whose effect is recognized as limited by the facts with reference to
which and the purposes for which they were handed down. Had the
authors proceeded upon these assumptions they would have been forced
to content themselves with a less inclusive picture of the possibilities
of public control, but the result would perhaps have been more accurate
and more helpful. They could, for example, have chosen to study a
series of specific problems, one of which, by way of illustration, might
have been the possibility of thoroughgoing regulation of the coal or
oil industry. Here the series of decisions dealing with the distinction
between interstate and intrastate commerce, which in the book (p. 200
et seq.) is simply a source of perplexity, together with the Future
Trading and Grain Futures cases (p. 144 et seq.), might have provided
suggestions which when coupled with the facts of the industry under
consideration would have indicated a solution of the problem. Whether
there is a "logical economic pattern" (p. 205) in the mind of the courts
is interesting, but is, after all, of secondary importance for the purpose
in hand. Or the problem of railroad valuation might have been sur-
veyed with reference to the fate of a possible Congresssional prescrip-
tion of the prudent investment basis. There is room for a shrewd esti-
mate of the effect upon the Supreme Court of such a legislative decla-
ration following upon the decline in the price level and the criticism
to which the O'Fallon decision has been subjected. Some ground for
hope surely is present.
Clearly the aid of economics is necessary if the existing governmental
machine is to be rendered even remotely adequate to modern conditions.
Clearly, also, informed criticism of what courts and lawyers do will
continue to be of the greatest benefit. But if law and the other social
sciences are to be united in the service of the commonwealth it will
have to be primarily by means of a concerted attack upon specific issues
as they arise. Properly estimated, nothing in the existing legal system
presents insuperable obstacles to the securing of fruitful results from
such collaboration. To such an endeavor the present volume contributes
a preliminary clearing of the atmosphere-a critical survey which dis-
closes the errors of thought and suggests the errors in methods of
attack to which we have been subject. If it can be followed by an
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
effort to devise a technique for securing a more adequate, realistic deci-
sion of the issues which arise out of public control, the authors' purpose,
presumably, will have been fulfilled.
Ralph F. Fuchs.
Washington University School of Law.
Ex Parte: In the Matter of Lambdin P. Milligan. Edited by Mr. Samuel
Klaus of the New York Bar, in consultation with Prof. Underbill
Moore of the Yale Law School and Mr. James N. Rosenberg also
of the New York Bar. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 476 pp. 1929.
This is the first of a series of American Trials in contemplation by
the editors and the publisher, the series to be selected apparently with
a view to color, pathos, humor, drama, and human interest, rather than
for any social, political, economic, or jurisprudential significance that
may attach to the decisions. Among other cases to be covered in later
numbers, to quote the editorial foreword, "the Molineux Case," the "un-
solved sensational poisoning mystery of thirty years ago. Then . . .
the case of the Chicago Anarchists . . . the case of Sacco and Van-
zetti; Laidlaw against Sage, the melodrama in which Joseph Choate,
to the popular delight, plagued Russell Sage; the Leo Frank case,
Georgia's epic of mob violence; two old American piracy trials."
In the Milligan case, honored in its selection for first place in the
series, the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held
that the President had no power to provide for trial by a military
commission of persons not in the military service on charges of crime
committed in territory where the civil courts were undisturbed in the
normal exercise of their proper jurisdiction. Five of the judges, a
bare majority of the Court, went further and by way dictum denied
that even Congress itself had such power, though the remainder of
the Court were unwilling to commit themselves to the limitation on
Congress. On neither point is the case of any great importance, partly
because of the improbable recurrence of conditions in which the gov-
ernment might be inclined to resort to such power, and partly because
if the case had come before the Court while the war was yet in progress,
the decision might very well have been the other way.
Besides the majority and dissenting opinions of the Court, the book
contains a 62-page introduction by the editor to give a background and
setting to the case, a digest of the arguments of Henry Stanberry,
James Speed, and Benjamin F. Butler, who appeared for the govern-
ment, the arguments of James A. Garfield, Jeremiah S. Black, and
David Dudley Field, who appeared for the defense, Mr. Butler's reply
for the government, and two appendices, one of 200 pages giving a
transcript of the proceedings before the Military Commission and the
other giving the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merry-
man. The last is included presumably as an object lesson that in time
of war a decision like that in the Milligan case would probably amount
to no more than a despairing gesture.
Lacking practical significance as a legal precedent, the case is to be
read, as the editors have published it, for its human interest. But there
are many persons to whom a judicial opinion, however able the judge,
or a formal legal argument, however distinguished the lawyer, is an
effective disguise for the drama and the human interest that must be
found between the lines, so to speak, or in the background of the case.
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